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STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR SECTION 10(b) AND
RULE 10b-5: A NEW PROPOSAL FOR UNIFORMITY
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)
to regulate securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets operating in
interstate commerce.' Through section 10(b) of the Exchange Act Congress
prohibited any party from employing manipulative or deceptive devices in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 2 Pursuant to section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
promulgated rule 10b-5. 3 Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud or misstatement by any
person in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 4 The SEC chose
not to provide for a private cause of action under rule lOb-5. 5 Similarly,
Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act. 6 Numerous federal courts have held, however,

1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. (1982)). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for
the regulation of securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets that operate in interstate
commerce, foreign commerce, or through the mails. See 15 U.S.C. 78b (1982) (providing
reasons for regulation of exchanges). In addition to regulating securities exchanges and markets,
the Exchange Act provides for the prevention of inequitable and unfair practices on the
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets. Id. See In Re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig.,
843 F.2d 1537, 1547-48 (3rd Cir. 1988) (describing purpose of Exchange Act to prevent fraud
and unfair practices on exchanges and markets).
2. See 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1982) (section 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act). Section 10(b)
prohibits persons from using any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the
purchase or sale of any registered or unregistered security. Id. Congress granted the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power to prescribe regulations in the public interest to
protect investors in securities. Id. Section 10(b) prohibits any person from employing deceptive
devices or contrivances to contravene the rules promulgated by the SEC pursuant to section
10(b). Id.
3. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1988).
4. Id. Rule lob-5 prohibits any person from directly or indirectly using any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, the mails, or any national securities exchange to
defraud, misrepresent or omit material facts, or engage in activity that would defraud or
deceive any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Id.
5. See Garrett & Kennedy, Conference on Codification of the FederalSecurities Laws,
22 Bus. LAW 793, 922 (1987) (general discussion of rule lOb-5 drafter Milton Freeman
concerning SEC's intent to prevent fraud in securities transactions by promulgating rule lOb5). Freeman explained the SEC's original purpose in adopting rule lOb-5 to the Conference
on Codification of Federal Securities Laws. Id. Freeman explained that the SEC contemplated
that only government agencies would use rule lob-5 to prevent fraud on the securities exchanges
and markets. Id. Freeman related that the SEC Commissioners did not anticipate that private
parties would use rule lOb-5 in civil proceedings. Id.
6. See Note, Statutes of Limitation For Rule lOb-5, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1021
(1982) (recognizing that Congress could not foresee private actions under section 10(b) when
enacting section 10(b)); see also Schulman, Statute of Limitation in 10b-5 Actions: Complication
Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. Rav. 635, 649 (1967) (discussing absence of congressional
intent for private right of action under section 10(b)).
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that a private right of action exists under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 7
Because neither Congress flor the SEC anticipated private actions under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5j neither Congress nor the SEC created a statute
of limitations for private actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. s
Because neither Congress nor the SEC provided a limitation period for
private actions under rule iOb-5, federal courts traditionally have borrowed
limitation periods from state statutes that are analogous to rule lOb-5.9 The
federal courts are split on which state statute of limitations applies to a
cause of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.10 The split among the
federal circuits causes confusion for litigants, a tremendous waste of financial resources in litigation to determine a proper statute of limitation, an
overburdening of the judiciary with unnecessary litigation, and forum shopping.' While all other circuits borrow state statutes of limitation for lOb-5
cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit borrows,
instead, a uniform federal statute of limitations. 2 The Third Circuit's
decision to borrow a federal statute of limitation offers a plausible solution

7. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (first
court recognizing implied right of action under section 10(b) and rule l0b-5); see also Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (noting implied right of action under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n. 9 (1971) (noting established practice of courts to recognize implied right of action under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5).
8. See D. Block & N. Barton, Securities Litigation: Statutes of Limitation in Private
Actions Under Section 10(b)- A Proposalfor Achieving Uniformity, 7 SEc. REG. L.J. 374
(1980) (noting judicial implication of private right of action under rule lOb-5 without concomitant federal limitation period).
9. See Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1988) (borrowing Louisiana securities
law limitation period for action under rule 10b-5); Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 825
F.2d 1521, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987) (applying Georgia common law fraud limitation period to
action under rule lOb-5), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2032 (1988); Teamsters Local 282 Pension
Trust Fund v. Angelos, 815 F.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 1987) (borrowing Illinois securities law
statute of limitations for action under rule 10b-5); infra notes 22-46 and accompanying text
(discussing courts that have borrowed state law statutes of limitation for rule lOb-5).
10. See, e.g., McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 896 (5th
Cir. 1979) (holding that fifth circuit courts should adopt limitation period from forum state's
law on case by case basis); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 431 (2nd Cir. 1977) (applying state
common law fraud limitation period to rule 10b-5); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783 (lst
Cir. 1965) (applying two-year limitation period from Massachusett's personal tort claims law
to action under rule lOb-5).
11. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing problems created by lack
of uniform statute of limitations for lob-5 cases).
12. See In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1545 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding
that uniform limitation period from Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides best limitation
period for all actions under rule lOb-5); infra notes 76-118 and accompanying text (discussing
Third Circuit's decision to borrow statute of limitation from federal securities law for lOb-5
cases); infra notes 22-46 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth, Seventh, and Fourth
Circuits' practice of borrowing state securities fraud or blue sky limitation periods for lOb-5
cases); infra notes 52-66 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth, Second, and Tenth Circuits'
practice of borrowing state fraud claim limitation periods for lOb-5 claims).
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for eliminating the problems that have resulted from the split among federal

courts over limitation periods for lOb-5 cases. 3
While the Third Circuit borrows a uniform federal limitation period in
lOb-5 cases, federal courts traditionally have chosen from a variety of state
statutes of limitation.

4

Courts often select a limitation period from state

5
law by choosing the state law most similar in purpose to rule lOb-5.1 Still

other courts choose the state statute that most closely matches rule lOb-5

by identity of elements. 16 Federal courts typically choose the statute of

13. See infra notes 76-118 and accompanying text (noting Third Circuit's solution to
problem of limitation period for 10b-5 claims).
14. See Beasley, Report of the Task Force On Statutes of Limitation for Implied Actions,
ABA COMM. ON FED. REO. OF SEcturTms 13-20 & app. A (1985) [hereinafter ABA task Force
Report] (providing circuit by circuit and state by state breakdown on limitation periods that
federal courts have applied to actions under rule 10b-5); see also BROMBERG & LowVNrrLS, 4
SEcurris FRAuD & COMMODrrmEs FRAuD 11:207-297 (1986) (providing survey of federal
circuits' policies for adopting state limitation periods in lob-5 cases).
15. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 9 (noting that most courts with
settled rules apply either state blue sky or common law fraud limitation periods for actions
under rule lOb-5).
16. Id. at 10. Courts choosing a state law limitation period for actions under rule lob5 sometimes determine that a state law limitation period is appropriate for a rule lOb-5 claim
because the substantive elements to the state law most closely resemble the substatntive elements
of rule lOb-5. Id. See Wood v. Combustion Engineering, 643 F.2d 339, 345-46 (5th Cir. 1981)
(considering commonality of elements rather than commonality of purpose in choosing limitation period for action under rule l0b-5); Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., 649 F.2d 641, 644
(9th Cir. 1980) (applying state fraud limitation period to action under rule lOb-5 because of
commonality of elements).
The Eighth Circuit applies a resemblence test that incorporates commonality of purpose
and commonality elements for determining the appropriate state statute of limitation for a
rule lob-5 claim . See In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litig., 533 F.2d 372, 373-74 (8th Cir. 1976)
(applying state blue sky limitation period to suit under rule lOb-5). The Alodex court developed
a resemblence test that directed courts to compare the elements of various state statutes with
the elements of rule lob-5. Id. The Alodex court considered what state statute of limitations
the court should borrow for a claim brought in Iowa under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id.
The Eighth Circuit noted that the Iowa blue sky law and rule lob-5 both promoted the
prevention of fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of securities. Id. The Eighth Circuit
noted, further, that the defenses available under the Iowa blue sky law were identical to the
defenses to an alleged rule 10b-5 violation. Id. Because the Eighth Circuit determined that the
Iowa blue sky law and rule lob-5 share a commonality of purpose and identical defenses, the
Eighth Circuit determined that the Iowa blue sky law passed the resemblence test. Id.
Consequently, the Eighth Circuit borrowed the statute of limitations of the Iowa blue sky law
for application to the rule lob-5 claim. Id.; see also Note, Section 10(b): Statutes of Limitation
in a Rule l0b-5 Implied Private Action, 13 CREIGHTON L.R. 1445, 1446 (1980) (describing
Eighth Circuit's application of resemblence test for determining statute of limitations for rule
lOb-5). But see ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 12-13. The ABA Task Force on
Statutes of Limitation for Implied Actions explained that federal courts that consistently apply
blue sky limitation periods to actions under rule lOb-5 often overlook technical distinctions
between the state blue sky laws and rule lob-5 because the courts perceive an overriding
commonality of purpose between state blue sky laws and rule l0b-5. Id. Common technical
differences between state blue sky laws and rule lOb-5 include proof of scienter -an intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud- an element required under rule lOb-5 but not essential
under many state blue sky laws. Id. at 13. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
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limitation from the forum state's blue sky or securities fraud law or the
state's common-law fraud claim.' 7 Most federal courts consistently apply
only one type of state statute of limitations to actions under rule lOb-5.1
Some courts, however, choose a state statute of limitations on a case by
case basis depending upon the facts, circumstances, and legal theories in
each case.19 Courts that choose statutes of limitation on a case by case basis
2
suggest that no one state law proves most analogous to every 10b-5 claim. 0
The federal court that first applied a forum state's blue sky law statute
of limitations in a lOb-5 case was the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in Vanderboom v. Sexton. 2' In Vanderboom the Eighth
Circuit considered whether sellers of securities in Arkansas aided, abetted,
and conspired to defraud a group of South Dakota investors in violation
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 22 The United States District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas granted summary judgment for the defendants. 23 On appeal to the Eighth Circuit the Vanderboom court noted that
if a federal law lacks a statute of limitations, a federal court should borrow
a limitation period from an analogous law of the forum state.2 The Eighth

193 (1975) (requiring proof of scienter to maintain cause of action for damages under rule
10b-5). Another distinction between many state blue sky laws and rule lOb-5 is that rule lob5 protects defrauded buyers and defrauded sellers of securities while state blue sky laws often
protect only defrauded buyers of securities. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 13.
17. See ABA

Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 9-12. The ABA Task Force on

Statutes of Limitation for Implied Actions reports that courts that decide to apply blue sky
or fraud limitation periods usually reach the decision by determining that the blue sky or
fraud statute best effectuates the federal purpose of rule lOb-5. Id. at 11. The Task Force
concluded, however, that courts perceive differently the federal purpose of rule lOb-5. Id.
18. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 13 & app. A & B (noting that most

circuits consistently apply either state common law fraud limitation periods or blue sky
limitation periods to lob-5 actions).
19. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at app. A & B (noting that Fifth and

Sixth Circuits apply state limitation periods to actions under rule lOb-5 on case-by-case basis).
20. Compare Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F. 2d 1536, 1551 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying
Ohio's fraud limitation period to action under rule lOb-5) with Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d
669 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying Kentucky blue sky law limitation period to action under rule
lOb-5). See BROMBERG & LowEaNrLs,

supra note 14, at 11:241 (noting that Sixth Circuit applies

different state limitation periods in different sixth circuit states because of wide variance among
state laws).
21. 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
22. Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 852 (1970). The Eighth Circuit considered a challenge by South Dakota investors in an
Arkansas corporation, Investors Thrift Corporation (ITC) against sellers of securities in ITC.
Id. The investors specifically alleged that Sam Sexton, Jr., an Arkansas attorney, and Jim
Hall, a former Vice President of City National Bank of Fort Smith misrepresented the nature
of the securities purchased by the South Dakota investors. Id.
23. Id. at 1236. The District Court granted summary judgment in Vanderboom for the
defendants on the ground that the action was time barred by the two-year statute of limitations
of the Arkansas Securities Act. Id at 1235. See Vanderboom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178,
1193 (W.D. Ark. 1969) (granting summary judgment for defendants on grounds that limitation
period of Arkansas Securities Act barred plaitiffs' claim).
24. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d at 1237. In Vanderboom the Eighth Circuit cited UWA v.
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Circuit explained in Vanderboom that a court considering a lOb-5 claim
should adopt the limitation period from local law that best effectuates the
federal policy of preventing securities fraud32 The Vanderboom court reasoned that the Arkansas law that best effectuated the policy of section 10(b)
26
and rule lOb-5 was the Arkansas law that most closely resembles lOb-5.
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the Arkansas blue sky law closely
resembled rule 10b-5 because at that time, unlike other state laws such as
the common-law prohibition of fraud, neither the Arkansas blue sky law
27
nor rule lOb-5 required the plaintiff to prove scienter by the defendant.
The Vanderboom court further recognized that both rule lOb-5 and the
Arkansas blue sky law lacked specific defenses. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Arkansas blue sky law most closely resembled rule lOb-5
and, therefore, best effectuated the federal policy of rule lOb-5. 29 Thus, the
Vanderboom court applied the two-year statute of limitations from the
Arkansas blue sky law to the investors' rule 10b-5 action.30
Like the Eighth Circuit, the United States Courts of Appeal for the
Seventh and Fourth Circuits also apply the limitation period of the forum
state's blue sky law to lOb-5 cases." The Fourth Circuit applied the Virginia
blue sky law limitation period to a rule 10b-5 claim in Gurley v. Documentation, Inc.3 2 In Gurley the plaintiffs, sellers of securities in Documentation
Inc., alleged that the defendants, Documentation Inc. and the law firm of
Testa, Hurwitz, and Thibeault, violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 by33
misrepresenting the legal period in which the plaintiffs could sell securities.
The defendants in Gurley argued that Virginia's two-year blue sky law

Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), to support the proposition that a federal court
should apply a limitation period from state law, rather than federal law, when a federal law
provides no limitation period. Id. Cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 107
S. Ct. 2759, 2762 (1987) (holding that federal courts may look to state or federal law to
borrow limitation period for a federal law that provides no limitation period).
25. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d at 1237.
26. Id. at 1237-38.
27. Id. at 1238-39. The Eighth Circuit noted that the requirement of scienter, not
included in the Arkansas blue sky law, is the defendant's knowledge of the falseness of the
impression produced by the defendant's statement or ommission. Id. at 1239.
28. Id. at 1239-40. The Eighth Circuit noted that a defendant against an Arkansas fraud
action may claim negligent misrepresentation as a specific defense. Id. at 1239. The Eighth
Circuit explained, however, that under rule lOb-5 and Arkansas blue sky claims, negligence is
not a defense. Id.
29. Id. at 1240.
30. Id.
31. See Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 815 F.2d 452, 455 (7th
Cir. 1987) (applying state blue sky limitation period to rule lob-5 action); Suslick v. Rothchild
Securities Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying limitation period from Illinois
three-year blue sky statute to rule lob-5 action); Gurley v. Documentation, Inc., 674 F.2d
253, 254 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying state blue sky law limitation period to rule lOb-5 action);
O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying Maryland's one-year blue sky
statute of limitations to rule lOb-5 action), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981).
32. 674 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1982).
33. Gurley v. Documentation, Inc., 674 F.2d 253, 254 (4th Cir. 1982).
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The plaintiffs

in Gurley insisted, however, that the court should apply Virginia's five-year
limitation period for common-law fraud to the plaintiffs' lOb-5 claim
because Virginia's blue sky law only protects defrauded buyers of securities.35
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed plaintiff's claim in Gurley16 On Appeal the Fourth Circuit noted
that the Virginia blue sky law, unlike common-law fraud, shared with rule

lOb-5 the purpose of prohibiting misinformation in securities transactions.3 7
Because the Fourth Circuit found that the policy behind the Virginia blue

sky law most closely paralleled the purpose of rule lOb-5, the Fourth Circuit

applied the Virginia blue sky law limitation period to the rule lOb-5 claim

in Gurley.38 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the

district court to determine whether the two-year limitation period of the
Virginia blue sky law barred the plaintiffs' rule lOb-5 claim.3 9

The Seventh Circuit also regularly borrows the forum state's blue sky
law limitation period in lob-5 cases.4

The Seventh Circuit considered

whether the Illinois five-year statute of limitations for common law fraud
or the three-year limitation period of the Illinois securities law applied to a
rule lOb-5 claim in Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos. 4'

In Angelos the plaintiffs, trustees of a union pension fund, made a substantial loan from the pension fund to defendant bank and accepted shares
of bank holding company stock as security for the loan. 42 The plaintiffs

alleged that the defendant bank and the bank's law firm misrepresented the
financial status of the defendant bank, in violation of section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5, when the bank offered the shares of stock as security for the
34. Id.
35. Id. at 258.

36. Id. at 254. The District Court dismissed plaintiff's claim under section 10(b) in
Gurley because the District Court determined that plaintiff had no standing under section
10(b). Id.
37. Id. The Fourth Circuit determined that plaintiff had standing and thus reached the
issue of which limitation period applied to plaintiff's rule lob-5 claim. Id.
38. Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that Virginia's blue sky law ordinarily protects only
defrauded buyers of securities while rule lOb-5 protects defrauded buyers and defrauded sellers
of securities. Id. at 259. The Fourth Circuit concluded, however, that commanality of purpose
rendered the Virginia blue sky law the most appropriate statute of limitation. Id. The Fourth
Circuit, therefore, empahasized commonality of purpose above commonality of elements in
choosing the proper limitation period for plaintiff's action under rule lob-5. Id.
39. Id.

40. Id. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 815 F.2d 452,
456 (7th 1987) (determining that state blue sky law limitation period applies to claim under
section 10(b)); Suslick v. Rothchild Sec., 741 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying state
blue sky limitation period to rule lOb-5 claim); Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625 F.2d 151, 153
(7th Cir. 1980) (applying state blue sky law limitation period to private action under rule lOb5); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) (applying Illinois blue sky
limitation period to claim under rule lOb-5).
41. 815 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1987).
42. See Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 815 F.2d 452, 453 (7th
1987).
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loan. 43 The plaintiffs in Angelos argued that the Illinois statute of limitations
period for common law fraud should govern the plaintiffs' rule 10b-5
claim." On appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, however, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the forum
state's securities law and rule 10b-5 shared the common purpose of prohibiting securities fraud. 4 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the threeyear statute of limitations period of the Illinois securities law applied to
plaintiffs' rule lOb-5 claim in Angelos. 46
Although the Fourth, Eighth, and Seventh Circuits apply similar reasoning in determining that state blue sky or securities fraud laws provide
the best statutes of limitation for actions under rule 10b-5, the courts'
decisions can produce uneven results.47 State securities fraud or blue sky
laws provide widely varying limitation periods.4" The Illinois securities fraud
law in Angelos provided a three-year statute of limitation while the Virginia
blue sky law in Gurley provided a two-year limitation period. 49 Thus,
although the Seventh Circuit in Angelos and the Fourth Circuit in Gurley
applied similar reasoning in choosing a limitation period for 10b-5 cases,
the courts' holdings resulted in different limitation periods for the respective
plaintiff's rule 10b-5 claims.5 0 Therefore, although the Fourth, Eighth, and
Seventh Circuits uniformly apply statutes of limitation from state blue sky
or securities fraud laws, the three courts have failed to create a uniform
rule lOb-5 limitation period."'

43. Id. at 453-54.
44. Id. at 455.
45. Id. at 455-56. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth
Circuit's reasoning in adopting Virginia blue sky law for actions under rule 10b-5).
46. See Angelos, 815 F.2d at 457 (determining that state blue sky law limitation period
applies to claim under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5).
47. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (noting that Fourth, Eighth, and Seventh
Circuits uniformly apply blue sky limitation periods to lob-5 claims but create different
limitation periods for rule lOb-5 actions); see supra notes 22-46 and accompanying text
(discussing reasoning behind Fourth, Eighth, and Seventh Circuits' rules for borrowing state
blue sky and securities fraud limitation period for rule lOb-5 actions).
48. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at App. B. The ABA's 1985 report on
statutes of limitation noted that state blue sky limitation periods range from one year in
Maryland to two years in Arkansas, Conneticut, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia to three years in Illinois,
Kentucky, and Louisiana to a period of one year from discovery and three years from the
actual misconduct in Wisconsin. Id. Therefore, even within circuits that uniformly borrow
state blue sky limitation periods in lOb-5 cases, federal courts may apply widely disparate
limitation periods depending on the state where plaintiffs bring the lob-5 claim. Id.
49. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text (discussing holdings in Angelos and
Gurley).
50. Id. Compare Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th 1984)
(applying Illinois three-year blue sky limitation period to rule lOb-5 claim) with O'Hara v.
Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying Maryland's one-year blue sky statute of
limitations to claim under rule 1Ob-5), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981).
51. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing disparate limitation periods
resulting from similar holdings of Fourth, Eighth and Seventh Circuits).
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Unlike the Eighth, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits the United States Courts
of Appeal for the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits regularly apply
limitation periods from state common law fraud statutes to actions under
rule lOb-5.1 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for
example, considered which of several state law limitation periods to apply
to a rule lOb-5 claim in United California Bank v. Salik.5 5 In Salik the
plaintiff, United California Bank (UCB), claimed that it had purchased
shares of the defendant bank's stock after the defendant previously had
incurred a $40,000,000 loss and purposely had failed to disclose the loss to
UCB.14 UCB filed an action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 against the

defendant bank eighteen months after UCB discovered the defendant's
deceit."

The United States District Court for the Southern District of

California held that the statute of limitations of California's securities fraud
statute barred UCB's claim.5 6 UCB appealed the District Court's decision

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 7 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit considered whether California's securities law limitation
period of one year or California's four year limitation period for commonlaw fraud applied to UCB's rule 10b-5 claim.5 8 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that Congress intended a very expansive application of section 10(b).5 9 The
Ninth Circuit observed, further, that the longer limitation period for California common law fraud best served the broad remedial policies of the
federal securities laws because the longer limitation period allowed harmed
parties greater access to recourse against persons engaging in securities
fraud. 60 Accordingly, the Salik court applied to UCB's claim the longer
limitation period for California common-law fraud. 6'

52. See Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson, & Curtis, 739 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir.
1984) (applying California's three-year limitation period for fraud to rule lOb-5 claim);
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1983) (applying New York six-year limititation
period for fraud to rule 10b-5 claim); Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 874-75 (10th Cir.
1982) (applying Utah's three-year fraud statute of limitations to rule lOb-5 claim); United
California Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding California three-year
limitation period for fraud claims appropriate for rule lOb-5 claim); see infra notes 53-66 and
accompanying text (discussing case holdings of federal circuits that borrow state common law
fraud limitation periods for 10b-5 cases).
53. 481 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1973).
54. See United California Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1973). The
defendant bank in Salik incurred $40,000,000 in debt by trading in high risk commodities
futures. Id. UCB, the purchaser of the defendant bank's securities, alleged that the defendant
bank breached a duty to disclose these losses to UCB. Id.
55. Id. at 1013.
56. Id. at 1013. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held in Salik that California's securities fraud statute barred UCB's claim. Id. California's
securities fraud statute provides that a claim must be filed within one year of discovering the
alleged violation. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1014-15.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1015. The Ninth Circuit refused to apply the California securities fraud
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The United States Courts of Appeal for the Tenth and Second Circuits
also regularly borrow the forum state's common law fraud limitation period
for claims under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 62 Like the Ninth Circuit, the
Tenth and Second Circuits have adopted state common-law fraud limitation
periods because the fraud limitation periods are longer than blue sky
limitation periods. 6 Courts in the Tenth and Second Circuits recognize a
congressional desire for broad application of rule 10b-5. 64 Other federal
courts perceive significant technical differences between state securities laws

statute's limitation period in Salik because the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the one year
limitation period did not serve the broad remedial purpose of the federal securities law. Id.
The Ninth Circuit traditionally had applied the forum state's fraud limitation period to claims
under section 10(b). Id. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that applying the California
securities fraud limimtation period to UCB's claim would inject further uncertainty into the
federal prosecution of claims under section 10(b). Id.
61. Id.
62. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983). In Armstrong shareholders
in a Bahamian investment company sued the investment company, claiming that managers and
trustees of the company fraudulently had concealed information concerning mutual fund
investments and the financial status of the investment company in violation of section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5. Id. at 82-86. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York partially dismissed shareholders' complaint because New York's limitation period
for common law fraud, two years from the wrongdoing or six years from the time the cause
of action accrued, barred the plaintiffs' securities fraud claim. Id. at 86. The plaintiff appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. On appeal the Second
Circuit agreed that the New York statute of limitations for common law fraud customarily
governs securities fraud cases in New York State. Id. Consequently, the Second Circuit held
that New York's common law fraud limitation period applied to plaintiff's claim of securities
fraud under section 10(b). Id. at 87.
See Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 873 (10th Cir. 1982). In Loveridge purchasers
of debentures issued by a supposed commodities import corporation alleged that the incorporator, president, and secretary of the corporation misrepresented the actual existence of the
corporation when selling the debentures. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had
violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. at 873. The United States District Court for the
District of Utah entered judgment for the plaintiffs because the defendants failed to answer
plaintiff's complaint. Id. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, the defendants in Loveridge claimed that Utah's three year limitation period for fraud
claims barred the purchasers' section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claim. Id. The Tenth Circuit noted
that tenth circuit courts traditionally apply the forum state's limitation period for fraud to
10b-5 claims. Id. at 874-75. The Tenth Circuit recognized that the Utah fraud statute provides
that plaintiffs must bring a fraud claim within three years of discovery of the alleged
wrongdoing. Id. at 874. Because the purchasers of the debentures filed their 10b-5 claim within
three years of discovering the defendants' wrongdoing, the Tenth Circuit held that the Utah
fraud limitation period did not bar the purchasers' lOb-5 claim. Id. at 875.
63. See Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1975)
(borrowing Texas blue sky limitation period for 10b-5 claim soley because Texas blue sky
limitation period is longer than Texas fraud limitation period); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351,
1362 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that longer state fraud limitation periods better effectuate broad
remedial purposes of implied rights of action under section 10(b)); supra notes 53-61 (discussing
Ninth Circuit's analysis in applying state fraud limitation period to action under rule lOb-5 in
Salik).
64. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting reasoning of Second and Tenth
Circuit in applying longer fraud limitation periods to lOb-5 claims).
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and rule 10b-5. 61 Courts find that these differences render state securities
6
law limitation periods inappropriate for rule lOb-5 claims.

Although most circuit courts consistently apply a statute of limitations

from state securities law or common law fraud to rule lOb-5 claims, a
confusing disarray of limitation periods exist among the circuit courts. 67
The particular limitation period often varies within a federal circuit because
securities or fraud limitation periods vary from state to state. 68 Consequently,

a potential plaintiff wishing to bring a securities fraud action may suffer
substantial confusion in determining whether he even has a timely cause of
action under rule 10b-5.6 9 Commentators recognize the difficulties that arise
from the lack of a uniform statute of limitations for section 10(b) and rule

lob-5 claims. 70 Judges, scholars, and attorneys observe that the state of the

law concerning a limitation period for rule lob-5 actions has caused confusion within and among the circuits, and has required courts and litigants
to waste money and time to determine the timeliness of rule lob-5 claims. 71

65. See Wood v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that Texas fraud statute's limitation period applies to lOb-5 claims because Texas fraud statute
possesses elements more identical to rule lOb-5 than the Texas blue sky laws).
66. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing Fifth Circuit's reasoning for
borrowing state fraud claim limitation period rather than blue sky law limitation period for
rule lOb-5 action). See also ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 10-11 (discussing
federal courts' reasoning in not applying states' securities law limitation periods to actions
under rule lOb-5).
67. See, e.g., Suslick v. Rothschild Sec., 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984) (continuing
practice of consistently applying forum state's blue sky law to lob-5 claims); Buder v. Merril
Lynch, 644 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1981) (continuing practice of consistently applying forum state's
blue sky law to lOb-5 claims); O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980) (continuing
practice of applying consistently forum state's blue sky law to lOb-5 claims), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1124 (1981). See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth, Tenth, and
Second Circuit's consistent application of common law fraud statutes of limitation to lOb-5
claims); infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (noting confusing array of limitation periods
resulting from courts borrowing state limitation periods for lOb-5 claims).
68. Compare Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir. 1970) (applying two
year Arkansas blue sky limit to lOb-5 case in Eighth Circuit) with Burns v. Ersek, 591 F.
Supp. 837 (D. Minn. 1984) (applying three year Minnesota blue sky law limit to lOb-5 case in
Eighth Circuit).
69. See D. Block & N. Barton, Securities Litigation: Statute of Limitations in Private
Actions Under Section 10(b)- A Proposalfor Achieving Uniformity, 7 SEC. REG. L. J. 374,
375 (1980) (noting aggravating disparities among state statutes of limitation). Block and Barton
note that by attempting to incorporate the varied laws of the fifty states into federal law
results in unfortunate consequences such as widely inconsistent limitation periods for actions
under rule lOb-5. Id.
70. See infra note 71 (noting jurists, scholars, and attorneys observations of courts'
chaotic practice of adopting state limitation periods for lob-5 cases).
71. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 5-6 (observing confusion, uncertainty,
and wasteful litigation that result from lack of uniform statute of limitations for actions under
section 10(b)); Block & Barton, supra note 69, at 375 (observing aggravating confusion that
results from courts' incorporation of varying state statutes of limitation in lOb-5 actions);
BROMBERG & LowENFELs, supra note 14, at 11:294 (observing problems stemming from lack
of uniform limitation period for section 10(b)); Martin, Statutes of Limitation in 10b-5 Actions:
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Commentators have recommended various solutions.7 2 The most popular
remedy among commentators is to encourage congressional action or a
Supreme Court ruling adopting one uniform limitation period for section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 actions.73 Neither the United Supreme Court nor
Congress, however, has chosen to remedy the confusion resulting from the
lack of a uniform statute of limitations for claims under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5.7 4 Thus, parties wishing to seek redress for securities fraud under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 continue to face a confusing array of limitation
7
periods. 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
reexamined the practice of applying only state law limitation periods to
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims in In Re Data Access Systems Securities
Litigation.7 6 In Data Access the shareholders of Data Access Systems, Inc.
sued Data Access as a certified class immediately after discovering possible
fraudulent business and stock trading activities among Data Access and
three affiliated companies: Marc Service Company, Transnet Corporation,
and Olympic International Leasing Company.77 The shareholders alleged in

Which State Statute is Applicable, 29 Bus. WK. 443, 457 (1974) (observing dismal failure of
courts borrowing state limitation period for lOb-5 cases); Ruder & Cross, Limitations on
Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 21 DUKE L. J. 1125, 1148 (1972) (observing problem with courts
borrowing only state limitation period for lOb-5 cases); Note, Section 10(b): Statutes of
Limitation in a Rule 10b-5 Implied PrivateAction, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1455, 1459 (1980)
(noting that courts' adoption of varying state limitation periods for lOb-5 cases prevents
uniformity and promotes forum shopping); Note, Statutes of Limitation for Rule 10b-5, -39
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1021, 1044-46 (1982) (observing that courts' practice of applying state
law limitation periods to lob-5 cases forces courts to make confusingly esoteric inquiries).
72. See infra note 73 and accompanying text (noting that popular solution among
commentators is congressional or Supreme Court enactment of express limitation period for
lOb-5 cases).
73. See Block & Barton, supra note 69, at 384-85 (recommending congressional enactment
of express statute of limitations for section 10(b) actions); BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra
note 14, at 11:294 (recommending congressional enactment of uniform limitation period for
actions under rule lOb-5); ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at pp. 5-6 (recommending
congressionally enacted uniform limitation period for lOb-5 cases); Martin, Statutes of Limitation in lob-5 Actions: Which State Statute is Applicable?, 29 Bus. WK. 443, 459 (1974).
(recommending congressional enactment of express statute of limitations for section 10(b)
actions and criticizing Supreme Court's failure to provide limitation period for lOb-5 cases);
Ruder & Cross, supra note 71, at 1148-49 (noting that best solution to limitation question for
lob-5 cases is for courts to look to federal rather than state law for limitation period); Note,
Section 10(b): Statutes of Limitation in a Rule lOb-5 Implied Private Action, 13 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 1455, 1459 (1980) (recommending that federal courts borrow limitation periods from
analogous provisions in federal securities law for lob-5 cases); Note, Statutes of limitationfor
Rule lOb-S, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1021, 1044-46 (1982) (recommending congressional
enactment of express statute of limitations for section 10(b) actions).
74. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (noting that Supreme Court
has not adopted one uniform limitation period for actions under rule lOb-5).
75. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing confusing state of law
concerning limitation periods for section 10(b) and rule lob-5 actions).
76. 843 F.2d 1537 (3rd Cir. 1988).
77. In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1538 (3d Cir. 1988). After filing
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an amended complaint that Roger Tolins, a New York attorney, knowingly

misrepresented the financial condition of Data Access to Data Access
shareholders by disguising in financial disclosure papers the debts that Data

Access owed to the three affiliate companies. 78 The shareholders alleged

that Tolins' conduct violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 79 The shareholders

further alleged in the amended complaint that the I. Kahlowsky accounting
firm conspired with principals of Data Access to defraud the shareholders

by misrepresenting information to Data Access' auditors in violation of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 0 The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint because the plaintiffs filed subsequent to the
running of the two-year limitation period of New Jersey's blue sky law.8'

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held in
Data Access that New Jersey's six-year common law fraud statute of

limitations applied to the shareholders' section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims. 82

The defendants in Data Access, attorney Tolins and the I. Kahlowsky
accounting firm, appealed the decision of the District Court to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.8 3 The defendants claimed
that the two-year limitation period of New Jersey's blue sky law applied to

the shareholders' section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims.8 4 The Third Circuit
traditionally had applied limitation periods from state fraud provisions or

state blue sky laws to rule lOb-5 claims.8 5 The Third Circuit convened en

banc to consider, without the constraint of panel precedents, the effect of

new United States Supreme Court decisions on the choice of a limitation
period for claims under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 6 The Third Circuit
in Data Access noted that recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that
when Congress fails to include a limitation period in a federal law, federal
courts may borrow limitation periods from analogous federal laws. 8 7 Ac-

claims against the affiliate companies in Data Access, the shareholders filed three amended
complaints. Id.
78. Id. Data Access retained Tolins as counsel to assist Data Access in public offerings
of stock and in filing of disclosure statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission
regarding the public offerings. Id.
79. Id. The plaintiffs in Data Access specifically named Tolins and the I. Kahlowsky
accounting firm as defendants in the third amended complaint. Id.
80. Id.at 1538-39.
81. Id. at 1538.

82. Id. at 1537.
83. Id.
84. Id.

85. Id.The Third Circuit traditionally chose a state limitation period for lOb-5 cases on
a case-by-case basis depending on the facts and legal theories presented in each case. See
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying New Jersey six-year
limitation period for common law fraud claims to action under rule lOb-5); Biggans v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania common law fraud
limitation period to action under rule lOb-5).
86. Id. at 1538.
87. In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1540. The Third Circuit in DataAccess cited Agency

Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987) and DelCostello v. International
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cordingly, the Third Circuit held that the proper limitation period for
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 claims is the limitation period from the most
analogous federal law.88
In concluding that the limitation period from the most analogous federal
law applies to actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the Data Access
court considered a new two-part procedure that the Supreme Court established in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates"9 to determine
whether to apply a federal or state statute of limitations to a federal law
that provides no limitation period9 ° In Malley-Duff a local Pennsylvania
insurance agency, Malley-Duff and Associates, claimed that a regional
insurance company, the Crown Life Insurance Company, conspired with
key Crown Life employees to acquire Malley-Duff's lucrative sales area by
false and fraudulent means in violation of the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 9' Because no express limitation period
for civil claims appears in RICO, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania considered what statute of limitations
should apply to the civil RICO claim.9 2 The District Court determined that
the two-year limitation period for fraud actions in Pennsylvania barred
Malley-Duff's RICO claim.93 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the
District Court and reinstated Malley-Duff's RICO claim.94 The Third Circuit
applied, instead, Pennsylvania's catchall six-year limitation period to plaintiff's civil RICO claim.95 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider what statute of limitations courts should borrow for civil RICO
claims. 9
On appeal the Supreme Court recognized in Malley-Duff that courts
normally apply a state limitation period when a federal law provides no

Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), to support the Third Circuit's choice to adopt an
analogous federal statute of limitations to actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. See
infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decision to apply federal
limitation period to civil RICO claim in Malley-Duf/); infra note 101 and accompanying text
(noting Supreme Court's decision to apply federal limitation period to claim under federal
labor law in DelCostello).
88. Id.at 1549.
89. 107 S.Ct. 2759 (1987).
90. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1542 (adopting Supreme Court test for determining
appropriate limitation period for federal statutes lacking limitation period). See Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2762 (1987) (creating two part analysis for
adopting statute of limitations).
91. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2760 (1987).
92. Id.
93. Id. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted
summary judgment for respondents in Malley-Duff because the District Court determined that
Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations for fraud barred petitioner's RICO claim. Id.
The District Court reasoned that in the absence of a RICO limitation period, the Pennsylvania
two-year statute of limitation for fraud provided the best state law analogy to RICO. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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limitation period. 97 The Supreme Court suggested, nevertheless, that courts

may borrow federal law limitation periods for federal laws lacking limitation
periods. 98 The Supreme Court held that courts must apply a two-step

procedure to determine the proper limitation period to apply to a federal
law that lacks a limitation period. 99 The Supreme Court stated that a court

should determine, first, whether all claims arising out of a federal statute
should be characterized in the same way or whether each claim should be
characterized differently depending upon the factual circumstances and legal
theories in the case. 100 The Malley-Duff Court explained that if the examining

court determines that a uniform evaluation of all claims arising out of a
federal statute is appropriate, the examining court should determine, second,
whether a state or federal statute of limitations more properly would govern

claims arising under the federal statute.10' The Supreme Court decided in

97. Id.
98. Id. at 2762.
99. Id.
100. Id. In announcing the first prong of the two-part Malley-Duff procedure for choosing
a statute of limitation for a federal law lacking a statute of limitation, the Supreme Court
cited its earlier decision in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985). Id. In Wilson the
plaintiff claimed under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1982) (§ 1983) that a New Mexico State Trooper
violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights by brutally beating the plaintiff during an arrest.
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 261. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claim, arguing that
the two-year limitation period of the forum state's tort claims act barred the plaintiff's claim.
Id. at 263. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico held, instead,
that the four-year residual state statute of limitations applied to the plaintiff's § 1983 claim
and refused to dismiss the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 264. The defendant appealed the district
court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 265.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit reasoned that an action under § 1983 is, in essence, an action
for injury to personal rights. Id. Because the Tenth Circuit reasoned that 1983 claims are
personal injury claims, the Tenth Circuit held that the appropriate limitation period was the
forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions . Id. Consequently, the Tenth
Circuit held that the forum state's three-year limitation period for personal injury actions did
not bar the plaintiff's claim. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider which
statute of limitations applied to the plaintiff's § 1983 claim. Id.
In Wilson the Supreme Court reasoned that when choosing a statute of limitation for a
federal law lacking a limitation period, courts must consider, first, whether state law or federal
law best characterizes the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 268. Having concluded that the state personal
injury statute of limitations is most appropriate for § 1983 claims, the Supreme Court considered
whether to characterize all § 1983 claims in the same or on a case-by-case basis. Id. The
Supreme Court in Wilson reasoned that courts uniformly should consider all claims under §
1983 in order to promote federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and economy in federal
tort litigation. Id. at 275. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit's
application of the New Mexico three-year statute of limitation to plaintiff's claim under §
1983. Id. The Supreme Court borrowed this part of the Wilson analysis for the first prong of
the Malley-Duff two-part procedure. Malley-Duff, 107 S.Ct. at 2760.
101. Id. In announcing the second prong of the two-part Malley-Duff procedure for
choosing an appropriate limitation period for a claim under a federal statute lacking a statute
of limitation, the Supreme Court relied on its earlier decision in DelCostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1982). Id. In DelCostello an employee and union member
alleged that the defendant union breached a duty of fair representation by mishandling
grievance-and-arbitration proceedings in violation of federal labor law. DelCostello, 462 U.S.
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Malley-Duff to adopt a uniform statute of limitations for all civil claims

arising under RICO to avoid intolerable uncertainty and time consuming
litigation in federal courts.102 After determining the need for a uniform
limitation period for civil RICO actions, the Malley-Duff Court held that
the statute most analogous to RICO was the federal Clayton Act.103 The

Supreme Court found the Clayton Act most analogous to RICO because
the Clayton Act and RICO employ common civil enforcement mechanisms
against, respectively, trusts and organized crime.04 The Supreme Court
noted that no state law employs civil enforcement mechanisms similar to
those in RICO and the Clayton Act. 05 Consequently, the Supreme Court
held that the Clayton Act's four-year statute of limitations applies to all

civil RICO claims. 3 6

at 154. The federal labor law at issue in DelCostello provided no statute of limitation. Id.
The defendant union asserted that Maryland's thirty-day statute of limitations for actions to
vacate arbitration awards barred the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 156. The United States District
Court for the District of Maryland applied the thirty-day state limitation period and granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. The plaintiff appealed the District Court's
holding to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Id.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court. Id. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriate limitation period for the plaintiff's claim.
Id.
On appeal the Supreme Court noted that the choice of a limitation period for a federal
cause of action is itself a federal question and that courts may consider both federal and state
law in searching for the best limitation period for the federal law. Id. at 159 n. 13. The
Supreme Court noted that when another federal statute clearly provides a closer analogy to
the federal law lacking a limitation period than available state statutes and the federal policies
at stake and the practicalities of litigation make the rule more appropriate for the claim in
question, courts should adopt the statute of limitations from the federal statute. Id. at 172.
The Supreme Court in DelCostello found that section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NRLA) proved more analogous to the plaintiff's claim than any available state law. Id.
The Supreme Court observed that the limitation period for the NLRA is longer than typical
limitation periods offered by state law. Id. at 166-67. The Supreme Court concluded in
DelCostello that the longer NRLA limitation period allows unsophisticated laborers a better
opportunity to realize the inadequacy of their union representation in arbitration, find counsel,
determine whether a claim exists against the union representatives, and file suit against the
union. Id. The Supreme Court concluded, further, that shorter state law limitation periods
would discourage laborers from seeking relief from union wrongdoings. Id. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court in Delcostello applied the statute of limitations from section 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act. Id.
102. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2764 (1987).
103. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned in Malley-Duff that both RICO and the Clayton
Act remedy injuries to a business or property by reason of a violation. Id. The Supreme Court
examined the legislative history of RICO and determined that Congress had borrowed the
purpose and concepts of federal antitrust law found in the Clayton Act for application in
drafting RICO. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined that the Clayton Act was the
most analogous law from which the court could borrow a limitation period for the plaintiff's
civil RICO claim in Malley-Duff. Id.
104. Id. at 2764-65. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (discussing specific
circumstances that Supreme Court considered in determining that limitation period from
Clayton Act applies to civil RICO claims).
105. See Malley-Duff, at 2764-65.
106. Id. Justice Scalia concurred in the Supreme Court's holding in Malley-Duff that the
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Applying the two-part Malley-Duff test in DataAccess, the Third Circuit

determined, first, whether courts should apply a uniform statute of limitations to all rule lOb-5 claims or whether courts should choose a statute of
limitations on a case by case basis depending on the facts and legal theories

presented in each case.?° The Third Circuit noted in Data Access that the

Third Circuit previously had recognized the necessity for establishing a
uniform limitation period for actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 0°
The Third Circuit reaffirmed a desire to promote certainty, uniformity, and
economical litigation under rule l0b-5.'09 Consequently, the Third Circuit

decided to select one statute of limitations for all section 10(b) and rule
lob-5 claims.110
After explaining the need for a uniform limitation period for all section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims, the Third Circuit applied the second prong of

the two-part Malley-Duff test and considered whether to borrow a federal
or state limitation period."' The Third Circuit examined companion provi-

sions to section 10(b) within federal securities law that govern liability for
manipulation of security prices, misleading statements in stock disclosure

statements to the SEC, and the buying and selling of securities within six
months." 2 The Third Circuit observed that Congress established a limitation
period of one year from discovery and in no event longer than three years
from the actual violation for companion provisions to section 10(b)."1 The
Third Circuit reasoned in Data Access that section 10(b) and the companion

Clayton Act provided the best statute of limitations that the court considered for civil RICO.
Id. at 2767. Justice Scalia argued, however, that when a federal law lacks a limitation period
and a court can find no appropriate state limitation period because the policies of analogous
state statutes run afoul of the underlying policy of the federal law, the court should borrow
no statute of limitation for the claim. Id. at 2772. Justice Scalia noted the Court's long history
of applying a limitation period from state law to federal statutes lacking a limitation period.
Id. at 2766. Justice Scalia noted further that congressional silence on the limitations issue
implies that Congress intends for courts to borrow state law limitation periods for federal
statutes. Id. at 2771. Accordingly, Justice Scalia concluded that the Supreme Court's new
policy of borrowing a federal limitation period for a federal law lacking a limitation period
runs contrary to the intent of Congress. Id.
107. See Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1542 (3d Cir. 1988).
108. Id. at 1543. See Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341 (3d
Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom, 107 S.Ct. 2759 (1987).
109. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1543.

110. Id. at 1544. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that Third Circuit
held that the one and three limitation period from analogous federal securities law is one best
limitation period for courts to borrow for all lOb-5 claims).
111. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545.

112. Id. at 1545-46. The Third Circuit considered various provisions in federal securities
law that the court found analogous to section 10(b). Id.; see 15 U.S.C. 78i(e) (1982) (prohibiting

manipulation of stock prices); 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) (1982) (requiring broker to disgorge profits
from purchase and sale of securities within six months); 15 U.S.C. 78r(a) (1982) (imposing

liability for misleading statements in applications and documents filed with SEC).
113. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1546. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text

(discussing one and three limitation period for provisions of federal securities law analogous
to section 10(b)).
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provisions to section 10(b) in the federal securities law share the common
purposes of requiring full disclosure in the sale of securities, preventing
fraud in the sale of securities, and compensating persons injured through
fraudulent securities practices." 4 The Third Circuit noted that state laws
provide widely varying statutes of limitation and disparate statutory coverage, while remedies under the federal securities laws are uniform in all fifty
states." 5 Because the Third Circuit determined that section 10(b) and the
companion provisions in federal securities law share common purposes not
addressed in analogous state laws, the Data Access court held that the
6
companion provisions are more analogous to section 10(b) than state laws."
Consequently, the Third Circuit held in Data Access that federal courts in
the Third Circuit uniformly should apply the federal securities law limitation
period of one year from discovery and no more than three years from the
7
violation in all section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions."1
While the Third Circuit's en banc opinion in Data Access adopts the
Supreme Court's two-part Malley-Duff analysis for choosing statutes of
limitation for federal laws that lack a limitation period, other federal circuits
have refused to adopt the Supreme Court's Malley-Duff analysis in actions
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. "I s Like the Ninth Circuit, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply the twopart Malley-Duff analysis in Durham v. Business Management Associates." 9
In Durham the Eleventh Circuit considered a securities fraud charge by
investors in a limited partnership.'12 The plaintiffs alleged that sellers of
securities in a limited partnership violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 by
fraudulently misrepresenting the nature of a sham limited partnership to
prospective purchasers.' 2' The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama refused to grant summary judgment in favor of the
defendants because the District Court could not determine which statute of
limitations applied to the plaintiff's claim under section 10(b) and rule lOb5."2 On interlocutory appeal the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Alabama's two-year statute of limitations for state securities fraud applied to

114. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1548.
115. Id. at 1549.

116. Id.See infra notes 150-155 and accompanying text (discussing specific circumstances
Third Circuit considered in deciding to borrow limitation period of companion provisions of

federal securities law for claim under section 10(b)).
117. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1548; see also Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., No. 87-3575
slip op. (3d Cir. July 14, 1988) (deciding to retroactively apply new policy of borrowing

federal limitation period for lob-5 cases).
118. See infra notes 163-166 (discussing refusal of other federal courts to apply Malley-

Duff analysis in actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5).
119. 847 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1988). See Durham v. Businesss Management Assoc., 847
F.2d 1505, 1507 (11th Cir. 1988) (applying Alabama two-year statute of limitation for securities

fraud to action under rule 10-5).
120. Durham v. Business Management Assoc., 847 F.2d 1505, 1507 (11th Cir. 1988).

121. Id.at 1507-8.
122. Id.at 1507.
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the investors' claim under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.12 The Durham court
recognized the Third Circuit's application of the two-part Malley-Duff
procedure in Data Access but refused to break from the Eleventh Circuit

precedent of applying thp forum state's limitation period for the cause of
action most resembling the federal claim.'2 The Durham court determined
that the Alabama securities fraud statute most closely resembled the investors' claim under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.1 25 Consequently, the Eleventh

Circuit held in Durham that the two-year limitation period applicable to
Alabama's securities law applied to the plaintiff's claim under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5. 26 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit in Durham expressly declined
to follow DataAccess by refusing to apply the two-part Malley-Duff analysis

27
to a claim under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.1
Recent federal courts' decisions do not indicate a trend toward a uniform
statute of limitations for actions under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. l'. While

the Third Circuit reasoned in Data Access that the Supreme Court's Malley-

Duff two-part analysis applies to lOb-5 cases, the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits as well as some district courts, have rejected the Third Circuit's
reasoning. 29 Unless federal courts uniformly accept the Third Circuit's

123. Id. at 1508.
124. Id.

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's
holding in Davis).
128. Id. See supra notes 118-127 and accompanying text (discussing federal court holdings
on rule lOb-5 statute of limitations subsequent to Data Access). Outside the Third Circuit, the
limited number of reported federal district court opinions subsequent to Data Access reveal
equal acceptance and rejection of the DataAccess application of the Supreme Court's MalleyDuff decision. See Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines, & Jonas, 695 F. Supp. 1156, 1160-62
(D.Wyo. 1988) (applying Malley-Duff two part test to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claim);
Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp., 686 F. Supp. 199, 206-7 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (refusing to
follow Data Access adoption of federal limitation period for rule lOb-5).
129. See Davis v. Birr, Wilson, & Co., 839 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1988). In Davis the Ninth
Circuit considered an action by an investor against a securities brokerage firm for alleged
violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California granted summary judgment for the defendant brokerage firm. Id. On
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Davis court considered whether the California three-year
limitation period for fraud barred the plaintiff's action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
Id. The Davis court noted that the Ninth Circuit consistently had applied the state fraud
limitation period to actions under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. at 1369-70. See Robuck v.
Dean Witter & Co., 649 F.2d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying state fraud limitation period
to claim under rule lOb-5); United California Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1013-14 (9th Cir.
1973) (applying state fraud limitation period to action under rule lOb-5). Consequently, the
Ninth Circuit held in Davis that the California three-year limitation period for fraud applied
to plaintiff's claim under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Davis, 839 F.2d at 1370.
While the majority in Davis strictly followed Ninth Circuit precedent, Senior Judge Aldisert
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation on the
Ninth Circuit, wrote a concurring opinion in favor of applying the Malley-Duff two-part
procedure to determine the proper limitation period for plaintiff's rule lOb-5 claim. Id. at
1369-1376. Like his subsequent decision on the Third Circuit in Data Access, Judge Aldisert
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reasoning in Data Access, little hope exists for a nationally uniform statute
of limitations for section 10(b). 130 Therefore, only congressional legislation
imposing a uniform limitation period for section 10(b) claims or a Supreme
Court ruling applying a single statute of limitations to section 10(b) offers
complete resolution to the present confusion among federal courts. 3 '
Absent congressional action or a clear decision by the Supreme Court
applying directly to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the Third Circuit's Data
Access reasoning offers the most reasonable solution to the problem of
choosing an appropriate statute of limitations for lOb-5 cases.Is 2 The Third
Circuit's opinion in Data Access has reduced wasteful litigation and brought
certainty and uniformity to lOb-5 litigation in the Third Circuit.' 33 All
jurisdictions in the Third Circuit now uniformly apply the one and three
limitation period in section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions. 3 4 Other Circuits
could derive similar benefits by adopting the Third Circuit's Data Access
35
reasoning in lOb-5 cases.
In addition to being very practical, the Third Circuit appropriately
applied the Malley-Duff two-part test to a rule lOb-5 action in Data
Access. 3 6 The Supreme Court introduced the two-part Malley-Duff analysis

reasoned that the Supreme Court's holding in Malley-Duff sends a strong signal encouraging
federal courts to adopt federal limitation periods to bring uniformity to rule 10b-5 actions.
Id. at 1373. Judge Aldisert insisted that the confusing array of state fraud limitation periods
that the Ninth Circuit has applied to rule 10b-5 claims demonstrates a need for one uniform
limitation period for section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims. Id. Additionally, Judge Aldisert
reasoned that the companion provisions to section 10(b) in the Exchange Act better promote
the federal policy of section 10(b) than state fraud statutes. Id. at 1374. Judge Aldisert argued,
therefore, that the one and three limitation period found in most provisions of the Exchange
Act should apply to actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. at 1376. Because the one
and three limitation period did not conflict with the three years from discovery limitation
period of California' fraud law, Judge Aldisert concurred with the majority's decision in
Davis. Id.; see supranotes 119-127 and accompanying text (discussing Eleventh Circuits' refusal
to apply Malley-Duff court's reasoning to actions under rule 10b-5).
130. See supra notes 118-129 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits' refusal to apply Supreme Court's two-part Malley-Duff procedure to lOb-5 cases).
131. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing recommendations of jurists
and commentators for adoption of uniform limitation period for actions under rule lOb-5).
132. See infra notes 142-168 (noting Third Circuit's appropriate application of Supreme
Courts Malley-Duff reasoning to actions under rule lOb-5).
133. See Cohen v. McAllister, 688 F.Supp 1040, 1044 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (following Data
Access court's decision that all Third Circuit courts must borrow one and three limitation
period for claims under lOb-5).
134. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1551 (setting rule in Third Circuit to apply uniform
limitation period from federal securities law to all private actions under rule lOb-5).
135. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (discussing results of Data Access
opinion whithin Third Circuit); see also Cohen v. McAllister, 688 F.Supp. 1040, 1044 (W.D.
Pa. 1988) (following Third Circuit's holding in Data Access). The United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania easily concluded that the one and three limitation
period applied to plaintiff's rule lOb-5 claim in Cohen by following the rule set by the Third
Circuit in Data Access. Id.
136. See infra notes 137-141 and accompanying text (noting that Third Circuit appropriately applied two-part Malley-Duff procedure to lOb-5 case).
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to guide courts in determining the appropriate limitation period for any
federal statute that lacks a limitation period. 137 The Supreme Court did not
restrict the applicability of the two-part procedure to the civil RICO statute
at issue in Malley-Duff.'38 The Supreme Court, in developing the two-part
procedure for borrowing statutes of limitation, relied on prior Supreme
Court decisions in which the Court applied an identical analysis in cases as
widely varying as a cause of action under a federal civil rights statute and
a cause of action under a federal labor law. 3 9 The Supreme Court specifically
determined in Malley-Duff that a court properly may borrow a limitation
period from a federal law for a statute lacking a limitation period if the
court finds a need for uniformity and federal law better promotes the policy
interests of the statute than analogous state laws. 140 Consequently, the Third
Circuit in Data Access appropriately applied the Malley-Duff two-part
4
analysis in a context intended by the Supreme Court. '
In addition to appropriately applying the two-part Malley-Duff analysis
to claims under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the Data Access court correctly
applied the two-part Malley-Duff analysis to the specific facts and circumstances in Data Access.142 The Malley-Duff two-part procedure initially
directs a court applying the procedure to a federal statute to determine
whether courts should apply a uniform limitation period to the federal
statute in question or choose a statute of limitations on a case-by-case
basis.143 In determining that a uniform limitation period should govern all
claims under RICO the Supreme Court in Malley-Duff considered specific
circumstances surrounding the federal RICO law.'4 The Supreme Court
noted that most RICO cases involve interstate transactions. 45 The Malley-

137. See Malley-Duff & Assoc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1986),
aff'd sub nom, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2762 (1987) (addressing general problem of federal statutes
that lack limitation period).
138. See id., 107 S.Ct. at 2762 (noting that two-part procedure for determining statute
of limitation applies to any federal law).
139. See id. at 2762 (relying on prior Supreme Court precedent in developing two-part
Malley-Duff analysis for determining appropriate limitation period for federal statute); supra
note 101 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's analysis in Wilson); supra note
101 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's analysis in DelCostello).
140. See Malley-Duff, 107 S.Ct. at 2762 (announcing two-part Malley-Duff procedure for
determining proper limitation period for federal statute lacking limitation period).
141. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate application
of Malley-Duff two-part procedure to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claim).
142. See supra notes 76-117 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's holding in
Data Access).
143. See Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1988),
aff'd sub nom, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2762 (1987) (instructing courts to consider whether all claims
under federal statute lacking limitation period under consideration by courts should be
considered uniformly or whether courts should analyze individual claims on case-by-case basis).
144. See id. at 2762-64 (noting factual circumstances that Supreme Court considered in
determining whether limitation period, from federal or state law applied to claims under federal
statute lacking limitation period).
145. Id. at 2764.
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Duff Court reasoned that because civil RICO claims usually are of a multistate nature, plaintiffs often can bring civil RICO claims in one of several
states offering different statutes of limitation. 1" The Supreme Court warned
that the availability of multiple limitation periods in RICO cases might
encourage forum shopping because plaintiffs naturally will seek the jurisdiction with the most favorable limitation period. 47 The Malley-Duff court
reasoned, further, that multiple state limitation periods necessitate wasteful
and expensive litigation simply to determine what statute of limitation applies
to a civil RICO claim. 48 Thus, the Supreme Court in Malley-Duff considered
the multi-state nature of RICO cases, the consequent danger of forum
shopping, and the probability of expensive and wasteful litigation as specific
suggest a need for a uniform limitation period for civil
circumstances that
49
RICO claims.1
In applying the first prong of the two-part Malley-Duff analysis to the
facts in DataAccess, the Third Circuit considered circumstances analogous
to the circumstances that the Supreme Court considered in Malley-Duff
and, likewise, concluded that a uniform limitation period should govern all
lOb-5 cases. 5 0 The Third Circuit noted that, like the RICO case that the
Supreme Court considered in Malley-Duff, rule lOb-5 cases also are of an
interstate nature.' 5 ' Like the Supreme Court in Malley-Duff, the DataAccess
court cautioned that the availability of multiple state limitation periods
would lead to uncertainty among potential litigants in 10b-5 cases. 52 The
Third Circuit also noted in Data Access that the availability of multiple
limitation periods promotes expensive, unnecessary litigation to determine
53
what limitation period applies in section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions.
Consequently, like the Supreme Court in Malley-Duff, the Third Circuit in
Data Access held that confusion among litigants and expensive, wasteful
litigation necessitate one uniform limitation period for lOb-5 cases. 5 4 Thus,
the Third Circuit in Data Access firmly relied on the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in applying the first prong of the two-part Malley-Duff
procedure and determining the need for a uniform limitation period for the
55
federal law in question

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text (noting circumstances that convinced
Supreme Court of need for uniform limitation period for RICO claims).
150. See infra notes 151-155 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances considered
by Data Access court in determining need for uniform limitation period for actions under
section 10(b)).
151. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1549 (noting interstate nature of claims under rule
lOb-5).
152. Id. at 1542-43.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 147-158 and accompanying text (noting similarities between reasoning
of Supreme Court in Malley-Duff and reasoning of Third Circuit in Data Access).
155. See supra notes 147-157 and accompanying text (discussing analogous consideration
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After completing the first prong of the two-part Malley-Duff analysis,
the Supreme Court considered specific circumstances to determine whether
a state or federal law would provide the most appropriate limitation period
for all civil RICO claims. 5 6 In determining that the federal Clayton Act
provided the best statute of limitations for RICO claims, the Supreme Court
considered the legislative history of RICO and determined that Congress
relied on the civil enforcement aspects of the Clayton Act when it enacted
RICO. 17_ The Supreme Court observed, further, that RICO and the Clayton
Act remedy similar types of injuries. 5 Because the Supreme Court determined that RICO and the Clayton Act share similar congressional design
and redress similar economic injuries, the Supreme Court concluded that
59
the Clayton Act limitation period should govern RICO claims.Y
In applying the second prong of the Supreme Court's Malley-Duff twopart analysis to the lOb-5 action in Data Access, the Data Access court
again considered circumstances analogous to the circumstances that led the
Supreme Court to apply a statute of limitation from federal law in MalleyDuff.'60 The Third Circuit in Data Access considered the legislative history
of section 10(b) and analogous provisions in federal securities law and
recognized that section 10(b) and the analogous provisions in the federal
securities law share the common purpose of promoting full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate commerce. 61 The Third
Circuit further noted that section 10(b) and analogous provisions in federal
securities law share the common purpose of preventing fraud in the sale of
securities.1 62 The Third Circuit considered, finally, that both section 10(b)
and the analogous provisions in federal securities law redress injuries resulting from deceptive, fraudulent, and manipulative practices in issuing or
transfering securities. 63 Because the Third Circuit determined that section

of circumstances by Third Circuit and Supreme Court in, respectively, determining need for
uniform limitation period for rule lOb-5 and RICO actions).
156. See Malley-Duff, 107 S.Ct. at 2764 (considering whether courts should consider
uniformly all claims under RICO or whether RICO claims should be considered on a case-bycase basis).
157. Id. at 2764-65.

158. Id. at 2764. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text (discussing similar
injuries addressed in RICO and Clayton Act).
159. Id. at 2765.
160. See In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1544-45 (3d Cir. 1988)

(considering facts and circumstances to determine whether federal or state law limitation period
should apply to actions under rule 10b-5); supra notes 156-159 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's consideration of whether limitation period from federal or state
law applied to civil RICO cases); infra notes 161-164 and accompanying text (discussing Third
Circuit's application of second prong of two-part Malley-Duff analysis in Data Access).
161. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1544-45 (discussing common purpose of rule lOb-5 and
analogous securities law provisions).
162. See id. (considering whether federal or state law limitation period applies to all claims
under rule 10b-5).
163. See id. at 1545-47 (noting that section 10(b) and analogous provisions of federal
securities law redress same type of injury).
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10(b) and the analogous provisions of federal securities law share a common
congressional purpose and redress the same type of injury, the Third Circuit
concluded in Data Access that the limitation period from the analogous
provisions of the federal securities law should apply to private claims under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.'6 Thus, the Third Circuit in Data Access
closely followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in applying the second
prong of the two-part Malley-Duff analysis for choosing a limitation period
for a federal statute lacking a limitation period. 16
Absent a congressionally enacted uniform limitation period or a controlling decision by the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit's decision in Data
Access provides the best alternative solution to the problem of a limitation
period for claims under section 10(b) and rule lob-5. 66 The Third Circuit's
Data Access decision promotes uniformity and certainty and minimizes
expensive and wasteful litigation within the jurisdictions of the Third Circuit. 167 The Third Circuit appropriately applied the Supreme Court's twopart Malley-Duff analysis to the lob-5 claim in Data Access.'6 s Federal
courts face a continually increasing volume of lob-5 litigation.1 69 The
problem of finding a uniform statute of limitations for rule lOb-5 actions,
therefore, is becoming more and more acute. 70 By accepting the Third
Circuit's reasoning in Data Access, other circuits would bring some order
to the present jumbled maze of possible statutes of limitation for lOb-5

actions. '7'
John Stone Golwen

164. Id.at 1549.
165. See supra notes 160-164 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court and Third
Circuit's similar considerations in determining that federal law provides best limitation period
for all RICO and rule lob-5 actions).
166. See supra notes 142-165 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's correct
application of Supreme Court's Malley-Duff two-part procedure for choosing limitation periods
to rule 10b-5 context).
167. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (discussing results of Data Access

decision within Third Circuit).
168. See supranotes 136-141 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's appropriate
application of Malley-Duff procedure to the rule lOb-5 claim in Data Access).
169. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting substantial number of cases merely
addressing which limitation period is appropriate for rule lob-5 actions).
170. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing problems associated with

lack of uniform limitation period for private actions under rule lOb-5).
171. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (noting elimination of confusion
within Third Circuit from application of uniform limitation period for actions under rule lOb-

